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ABSTRAK 
Tujuan penelitian ini adalah menginvestigasi implementasi tata kelola perusahaan yang baik dalam 
sector industry telekomunikasi dan teknologi di Indonesia. Implementasi tata kelola perusahaan 
yang baik ini diukur dengan menggunakan aksi perusahaan, elemen-elemen tata kelola perusahaan 
yang baik dalam struktur organisasi, indicator independensi kepemilikan public oleh BvDEP, hasil 
laporan keuangan auditan, dan return ats asset total. Data diperoleh dari basis data OSIRIS dari 
tahun 2005 sd 2007 dan diuji dengan alat analisis regresi. Hasil studi ini memperlihatkan bahwa 
faktor-faktor yang mempengaruhi capaaian laba bersih di Indonesia adalah indikator independensi 
dan aksi perusahaan.
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 1. Background
This research is aimed at fi nding the empirical 
answers of the implementation of good corporate 
governance on the fi nancial performance achievement, 
especially the net profi t, in communication and 
technology companies in Indonesia country who 
owned an emerging capital market. This research 
is focussed on the communication and technology 
industry in Indonesia country based on the following 
reasons. First, existing research haven’t specifi cally 
discuss the industrial sector which is an interesting 
factor to be studied, since each sector of industries 
has its own different regulation. For example, some 
industries are highly regulated, like the banking 
sector, and some are not. 
Second, this reserach specifi cally focussed on 
communication and technology company since this 
type of company is considered as blue chip company 
whose stock are favorited in the stock market. 
By focussing on communication and information 
technology company, this research hopes to contribute 
more on understanding of which contributing factors 
affect the profi t gain. The above understanding will 
further help investor in making precise decisions.
Third, by focussing on one specifi c industry 
sector, which is communation and information 
technology sector, this research can get detail 
information on the subject which in turn will help the 
researchers in understanding the caharacteristics of 
pertinent sector compared to other sector, and also 
the general characteristics of each sector. 
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This study is focussed on testing the 
implementation of GCG principal which is proxy  with 
the transparancy of reported company activities, 
the quality of fi nancial report, public ownership, 
management performance, and the completeness 
of GCG organisation structure. Transparancy 
proxy of company’s movement is included as the 
implementation of transparancy principal in non-
fi nancial aspect. Company’s movement/ or activity is 
a variable which has never been tested in previous 
GCG research in Indonesia. The completeness of 
GCG organisation structure is measured by the total 
number of team in the GCG in communication and 
technology company. This is done in order to improve 
some proxies in completeness of GCG organisation 
structure. 
The implementation of GCG in Indonesia country 
has unique characteristics. Indonesia country chosen 
because of their characterictics of having specifi c 
communication and technology policy and capital 
market which are show performance communication 
and technology industry sector. Besides, Indonesia 
country has implemented the GCG between the 
period of 2001 to 2003, learning from the 1997-1999 
economic crisis which hit the region quite hard. 
Indonesia country were considered as the country 
suffered most from the economic crisis at 1997. Crisis 
which began in Thailand spread up to most countries 
in South East Asia. At that time, Indonesia was hit by 
the crisis at the most severe level, due to its intern 
political crisis. Many companies that did not implement 
the principal of GCG were collapsed. Learning from 
that crisis, countries in South East Asia Region then 
implement the good corporate governance in many 
companies, especially in stock market. Whereas the 
ideas of implementing the GCG has been sounded 
in the stock market in South East Asia countries from 
2001. 
Good corporate governance has been widely 
implemented in many companies in Indonesia since 
last decade. Prior studies suggest that implementation 
of good corporate governance may have an impact 
on fi nancial performance achievement. This research 
objective is to investigate the impact of good 
corporate governance implementation on the fi nancial 
performance achievement. To do so, this research 
provides an insight into the contributing factors to 
affect profi t gain.
The proxy of GCG implementation are 
transparancy of reported company activities, 
the quality of fi nancial report, public ownership, 
management performance, and the completeness 
of GCG organization structure. Company activities 
variable includes implementation of transparancy 
principal in non-fi nancial aspect. In addition, such 
variable has never been tested in previous GCG 
research in Indonesia. The completeness of GCG 
organization  structure is measured using total 
number of team in the GCG in telecommunication and 
technology company. 
Wedari (2004) measures the composition of 
GCG organization  board using existence of audit 
committee as a proxy. This proxy counted the 
composition of GCG organisation board with audit 
committee proxy which is measureb by ‘available’ 
or ‘not available’. Herawaty (2008) applies the 
independent commissioner as the GCG administration 
team proxy. Nuryaman (2008) uses the proportion 
of independent commissioner to the total number 
of the company’s board of commissioner. Based on 
the prior studies, the authors suggest that the proxy 
of GCG administration team is not merely consist of 
independent commissioner and audit committee. The 
comprehensive  GCG organization  structure involves 
independent commissioner, remuneration committee, 
audit committee, legal committee, compliance 
committee, mitigation committee, and corporate 
secretary. In 2001, Bapepam issued a guidance 
regarding the composition of GCG organization 
board, which consist of at least 3 parties: independent 
commissioner, audit committee, and company 
secretary. 
Ownership concentration is measured using 
independency of public ownership that is published 
by Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing. This is, 
as far as authors aware, among the fi rst to use the 
variable in GCG research in Indonesia. Previously, the 
ownership concentration is usually measured using 
managerial and institutional ownership (Midiastuty & 
Machfoedz, 2003; Wedari, 2004; Siregar & Siddarta, 
2006; Herawaty, 2008), and ultimate ownership 
(Siregar, 2008).
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2. Theorethical approach
2.1  Net Profi t.
Net profi t is an instrument to measure the 
company’s operational performance. It measures the 
success or failure of a business in achieving target 
of its operation (Parawiyati, 1996). Financial report 
is one of the signals from the company for external 
parties. Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts 
(SFAC) No. 1 (1978) stated that the main user of 
fi nancial report are investors and creditors, and it 
indicates that the main focus of fi nancial report is the 
information about the company’s profi t. Statement of 
Financial Accounting Concepts (SFAC) No.1 (1978) 
also stated that the fi nancial report should deliver 
useful information for the investors and creditors, both 
existing and potential ones, in deciding the policy of 
investment, credit, and other decisions. Investor and 
creditor use the profi t to: (a) Evaluate the management 
performance. (b) Estimate the earning power. (c) 
Predict the future profi t. (d) Assess the investment risk 
or the company’s loan (SFAC no.1). 
Creditors can use the net profi t information to 
make a loan decision and to asses the credit risk. 
The use of net profi t to assess securities has been 
conducted in many stock exchanges (Ball dan Brown, 
1968; Beaver dan Dukes, 1972; Sloan, 1996). Sloan 
(1996) evaluates the information content in terms of 
accrual and cash fl ow components. He tries to see 
whether or not the information is refl ected in the stock 
price. Sloan (1996) also shows that the stock price 
will react if the investor ‘fi xate’ (believe) on the profi t. 
Sloan’s research (1996) was consistent with the 
fi xation of profi t by some of stock market participant 
on the total reported profi t without considering the 
size of accrual and cash fl ow components.  Mispricing 
phenomenon which was shown in Sloan’s (1996) 
research indicates that there is a tendency of over-
focussing on the reported profi t in the stock exchange. 
Carslaw and Kaplan (1991) found that 
companies that show negative profi t request their 
auditor to schedule the audit process quite late 
than the supposed schedule. This leads to delay of 
fi nancial report. The research argues that a company 
will tend to pospone its fi nancial report if there is a 
‘bad news’ in its report because it will affect the profi t 
quality. A company which has good (high) profi tability 
can be said as having a ‘good news’ in its fi nancial 
report. As a consequence, a company which has a 
‘good news’ tend to submit its fi nancial report on time, 
and vice versa.
2.2. Corporate Action
Corporate action is the actions taken by a 
company which is announced to public. This is 
a refl ection of a good administration and public 
transparency on the non-fi nancial aspect. In this term, 
corporate action - both national and multi national 
company - will also affect the stock price. Bureau 
van Dijk Electronic Publishing (2008) states that 
a complete format of corporate action included all 
values, consists of: company meeting, listing status 
change, announcement, preferential offer, bonus, new 
listing, buy back, issuer name change, preference 
conversion, local code change, arrangement, security 
description change, international code change, take 
over, etc.
2.3. GCG Team in Organization  Structure
Total number of member of GCG organization 
structure can be taken as the completeness of 
organization structure as an implementation of 
GCG principal which was required by the regulator. 
This variable is chosen considering the possibility of 
incomplete GCG organization structure existence, for 
example merely director and commissioner. Some 
countries have similar requirements to be implemented 
in GCG. The requirements are independent 
commissioners, audit committee, remuneration 
committee, nomination committee, compliance 
committee, legal committee, and risk committee. In 
Indonesia, according to Bapepam guidelines in 2001, 
the completeness of GCG organization  structure 
consist of independent commissioners, audit 
committee, and company secretary.
Some research show that there is an effect of 
size and composition of board of director in company 
activities. The size and composition of board of 
director can affect the effectivity of monitoring activity. 
The size and composition of board of director also 
affect the relationship between managerial ownership 
and institutional ownership on the company’s 
performance. According to Pfeffer (1973) the increase 
in size and diversity of board of director will benefi t 
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the company since it will expand the network and 
guarantee the availability of resources. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) stated that by including 
outside directors, the performance of the board 
will improve and it can minimize the management 
expropriation to the shareholder’s welfare. In doing so, 
audit committee facilitates a formal telecommunication 
between the board, management, external and internal 
auditor (Bradbury et al., 2004). Audit committee acts 
as the mediator when disputes occur between the 
management and auditors on the interpretation and 
implementation of generally accepted accounting 
principles (Klien, 2002). Anderson et al. (2003) 
investigated the relation between the characteristics 
of commissioners, fi nancial report integrity, and the 
cost of debt. 
2.4. Public Ownership 
Problems of ownership concentration in 
Indonesia indicate the agency problem between 
the dominant and minority stock owners occurs 
because of the separation between the cash fl ow 
right and control right (Siregar, 2008). This is different 
with a study by Jensen and Meckling (1976) that 
separates ownership and control. Machfoedz (2008) 
states that shareholder voice function indicates that 
commissioner is also responsible to increase the voice 
of owner (investors) to increase the company’s value. 
Claessens et al.(1999) defi ned the expropriation 
as a process which is used by the controlling share 
holder to maximize their own wealth or redistribute 
the wealth from other parties through the controlling 
power. Claessens et al. (1999, 2000) studied the 
expropriation of minority share holder in public 
companies in nine Asian countries by investigate 
impact of differentiation of cash fl ow and control rights 
to the company’s value, and observing the ownership 
structure of companies. 
Pyramid ownership and cross ownership are two 
most common mechanism used by the controlling 
shareholder to increase the control exceeds the 
fi nancial claim to the company. The concentrated 
ownership may relate to low level of law enforcement 
(La Porta et al., 1998 dan 2000). The results of La Porta 
et al. (1998) study may be understated due to the use 
of direct ownership data, not the ultimate ownership. 
By adopting La Porta et al (1999) methodology, 
Claessens et al., (1999, 2000) studied the controlling 
share holder which consist of individual, family or 
institution which have control in a company, both 
defi nite and indefi nite, at the cut-off level of certain 
privileges. In regard to ownership concentration, 
Morck et al. (2004) argue that the majority share 
holders which effectively control the company will also 
control the reported accounting information. La Porta 
et al. (2002) and Claessens et al. (2002) found that 
the ownership concentration in cash fl ow rights will 
increase the company’s value. 
2.5. Quality of Audited Financial Report 
Public accountant is one of the most important 
parties to produce a qualifi ed fi nancial report for 
the stock exchange. Public accountant’s role is to 
provide assurance that fi nancial report made by the 
management is free of material misstatement. The 
assurance is given by the public accountant through 
their opinion. According to PSA 29 SA article 508 in 
‘Standard of Public Accountant Profession’ there 
are fi ve categories of public accountant’s opinion: 
(1) unqualifi ed opinion; (2) unqualifi ed opinion with 
explanatory language; (3) qualifi ed opinion; (4) 
adverse opinion; and (5) disclaimer opinion. Carslaw 
and Kaplan (1991) stated that lateness in fi nancial 
report positively related with audit opinion. Companies 
receiving other than unqualifi ed opinion tend to have 
longer audit delay or tend to give their fi nancial report 
not in the expected time frame. On the other hand, 
companies that obtain unqualifi ed opinion from the 
auditor tend to submit their fi nancial report on time. 
2.6. Hypothesis
Gleaned from the literatures mentioned above, 
the current research proposes research model as 
shown in Figure 1. 
Net Profi t for each country = a  +  b1Public 
Ownership +  b2 Number of GCG structure + b3 
Corporate Action  + b4 Quality of Audited Financial 
Report + b5 Return of Total Assets + e
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Research Model
Based on the research model, the hypothesis is 
formulated as follows:
H1:  Corporate Actions, public ownership, the number 
of GCG structure, quality of audited fi nancial 
report, and return of total assets infl uence net 
profi t in information and telecommunication 
technology companies in Indonesia.
3. Research Methodology
3.1. Sample and Population 
The data population of this research is annual 
report of telecommunication  and technology 
companies registered in the stock exchange in 
Indonesia year of 2005, 2006, and 2007. Samples 
are selected using the following criterias: (1) The 
companies are registered in stock exchange; (2) 
Industry classifi cation: telecommunication and 
technology industry, based on Industry Classifi cation 
Benchmark (ICB), and (3) The closing of accounting 
period is 31 December. The totals of 38 samples were 
fi nally collected.
3.2. Variables
Dependent variable in the current study is net 
profi t (logged). Meanwhile, independent variables are 
as follow: 
a. Indicator of public ownership independency by 
Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing.
b. Corporate action.
c. Quality of audited report.
d. Return on Total Asset
e. Total number of GCG organization  structure 
These variables are then operationalized as: 
a. Net profi t is the profi t after the annual tax. 
b. Number of telecommunication and 
technology companies is the total number of 
telecommunication and technology companies 
in each country. 
c. Independency indicator by Bureau van Dijk 
Electronic Publishing (BvDEP). According to 
OSIRIS Data Guide (2003), BvDEP ownership 
indicators are: A+, A, A-, B+, B, B-, C+, C, C-, D, 
and U. The highest level ‘11’ is equal to A+, while 
the lowest level ‘1’ is equal to ‘U’ (unknown). 
The indicator of independency is used to help 
the users in identifying independent companies 
by marking their degree of independency based 
on the shareholders. The ‘A’ indicator will be 
company with non-registered owner less than 
24,99%, both direct and total ownership. BvDEP 
classifi es further the A level into A+, A, and 
A-. The ‘B’ indicator is given to company with 
percentage of registered ownership, both direct 
and total ownership, no more than 49,99%, but 
has one or more shareholders with more than 
24,99% ownership. BvDEP also classifi ed this 
grade into B+, B, and B-. The ‘C’ indicator is 
provided to company with registered ownership, 
either direct or total, more than 49,99%. The ‘C’ 
indicator indicates an ultimate ownership. The 
‘U’ indicator is assigned to company which is not 
belong to A, B, or C, categories, which indicated 
an unknown degree of independency.
d. Corporate action is activity conducted by the 
company and announced to public which can 
be regarded as company transparency and 
good administration from nonfi nancial aspect. 
Corporate action that can be both national and 
international level may infl uence the share price. 
Corporate action is measured by the number of 
activities published or announced to public (ratio 
scale).
e. Quality of audited report is level of opinion 
of audited fi nancial report, where score 4 for 
unqualifi ed opinion, score 3 for unqualifi ed 
opinion with explanatory paragraph, score 2 for 
no opinion, and score 1 for unaudited.
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f. GCG organisation structure is the completeness 
of organisation structure as the implementation 
of GCG which is required by the regulator. 
Each country has similar requirement to be 
implemented in GCG for instance independent 
commissioners, audit committee, remuneration 
committee, compliance committee, nomination 
committee, legal committee, and risk committee.
4. DATA ANALYSIS
In this stage, there are some tests performed: 
normality, multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity, and 
autocorrelation. To handle outlier data, missing value-
exclude cases listwise program was performed using 
SPSS. Before testing the hypotheses, the data is fi rstly 
tested in terms of data model regression feasibility, 
overall model fi t, and regression coeffi cient. The 
results show that no problem found from these tests.
The average score for corporate actions in 
Indonesia (2005-2007) is 16.71. The quality of 
audited fi nancial report indicates an average of 3.88, 
with 0.612 standard of deviation. It means that almost 
all data are near unqualifi ed opinion. The value of 
public ownership variable in Indonesia is 3.13.  The 
value of 3 is equivalent to C- and 4 is equivalent to 
C. The return of total assets in Indonesia is 6.6038. 
Interestingly, the number of organization structure as 
part of GCG completeness shows an average of 1 
with deviation standard is 0.00. This means that all 
the telecommunication  s and technology companies 
in Indonesia has only 1 GCG organization  structure. 
Summary of statistic results for Indonesia is presented 
in Table 1.
Table 1: Summary of statistic results for Indonesia
Variable Descriptive 
Statistics




N Adj. R2 Stand
Err of 
the est.
F Sig B Std.
Error
T Sig
Net income 3,558 1,343 24 0,706 0,728 14,781 0,00 4,632 1,035 4,476 0,000
Corp.Action 16,71 7,515 24 -0,059 0,025 -2,351 0,030
Financial 
Statement Quality
3,88 0,612 24 -0,339 0,249 -1,360 0,190
Independence 3,13 3,288 24 0,394 0,080 4,921 0,000
RoTA 6,6308 7,555 24 -0,001 0,031 -0,043 0,966
GCG Structur 1 0,00 24 - - - -
The average score for corporate actions in 
Indonesia (2005-2007) is 16.71. The quality of 
auidited fi nancial report indicates an average of 3.88, 
with 0.612 standard of deviation. It means that almost 
all data are close with unqualifi ed opinion. The value 
of public ownership variable in Indonesia is 3.13 
which is between values of 3 and 4.  The value of 3 is 
equivalent to C- and 4 is equivalent to C. 
The return of total assets in Indonesia is 6.6038. 
Interestingly, the number of organisation structure as 
part of GCG completeness shows an average of 1 
with deviation standard is 0.00. This means that all 
the communications and technology companies in 
Indonesia has only 1 GCG organisation structure.
The regression result s show value of Adjusted R 
Square of 0.706. ANOVA test shows that F score is 
14.781 with 0.000 level of signifi cance. It means the 
model is signifi cant. The whole independent variables 
affect the net profi t. Results of regression analysis 
show that public ownership and corporate actions 
variables infl uence net profi t in telecommunication 
and technology companies in Indonesia. However, 
the impact of quality of audited report and return of 
total assets on net profi t are not signifi cant. 
Corporate action is activity conducted by 
the company and announced to public which can 
be regarded as company transparency and good 
administration from nonfi nancial aspect. Corporate 
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Table 2: Analysis Summary
Location Corporate Action Financial Statement 
Quality




Indonesia √ - √ - -▓
√ = infl uenced
▓ = deleted because standard deviation is 0.00
action that can be both national and international 
level may infl uence the share price. Public ownership 
in identifying independent companies by marking their 
degree of independency based on the shareholders.
5. Summary
Summary of analysis results for Indonesia is 
presented in Table 2.
In Indonesia, the regression analysis using four 
dependent variables suggest that public ownership and 
corporate actions variables signifi cantly infl uence net 
profi t achievement.The study of GCG implementation 
in telecommunication  and technology companies in 
Indonesia shows structure of GCG variable excluded 
from the independent variables since its standard of 
deviation is 0.00. The regression analysis using four 
dependent variables suggest that public ownership 
and corporate actions variables signifi cantly infl uence 
net profi t. Finally, the current research contributes in 
developing the GCG organization structure variable, 
especially in the context of telecommunication  and 
technology companies in Indonesia. The variable 
is development of more comprehensive proxy that 
includes independent commissioners, remuneration 
committee, audit committee, legal committee, 
compliance committee, mitigation committee, and 
corporate secretary.
Stucture of GCG is very important for 
corporate performance, but in communication 
and technology industry sector in Indonesia with 
2005 – 2007 periods need to improve. Finally, the 
current research contributes in developing the 
GCG organisation structure variable, especially 
in the context of communication and technology 
companies in Indonesia. The development of more 
comprehensive proxy is an improvement of proxies 
of GCG completeness that are previously developed, 
for instance, by Wedari (2004), Herawaty (2008), 
and Nuryaman (2008). In the current study, the more 
comprehensive proxy for GCG organisation structure 
consists of independent commissioners, renumeration 
committee, audit committee, legal committee, 
compliance committee, mitigation committee, and 
corporate secretary.
There are some opportunities for future research. 
Instead of the total number of board of commissioners 
member, further research may use the proportion of 
total number of GCG organisation structure with the 
total number of board of directors and commissioners. 
Public ownership variable can also be developed 
further on the basis of types of the shareholders origin, 
which are domestic and foreign shareholders. In 
addition, ownership based on institutions (government 
institutions, private institutions or others) can also be 
further investigated. This will deeply enhance the 
understanding on shareholders structure.
There are some opportunities for future research. 
Instead of the total number of board of commissioners 
member, further research may use the proportion of 
total number of GCG organization  structure with the 
total number of board of directors and commissioners. 
Public ownership variable can also be developed 
further on the basis of types of the shareholders origin, 
which are domestic and foreign shareholders. In 
addition, ownership based on institutions (government 
institutions, private institutions or others) can also be 
further investigated. This will deeply enhance the 
understanding on shareholders structure.
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